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Abstract 
This paper evaluates aggregate-level partisan change in presidential and midterm elections at the 
county level in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas.  Specifically, this analysis focuses on how 
demographic, electoral, cultural, and economic variables affect the percentage of the electorate 
voting for the Democratic Party candidates for U.S. President and other statewide offices from 
1990 through 2016.  In addition, this study conducts sub-state regional analyses using U.S. 
Census Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to assess the local nature of partisan change in the 
U.S.  OLS regression and correlation coefficients, as well as difference of means test results 
indicate that increases in population density over time and the presence of a county in a large 
U.S. Census MSA of one million people or more increases average Democratic Party vote 
percentages.  Moreover, increases in the African American population in counties is an important 
positive factor for Democratic Party average vote percentages.  On the other hand, increases in 
median age and median household income decrease Democratic Party vote percentages.  Since 
1990, there has been a substantial erosion of Democratic Party support across counties outside of 
MSAs, particularly in midterm elections.  Overall, the results illustrate the growing 
urban/suburban and rural partisan divide in the U.S. at the county level.    
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The Evolution of Partisan Voting at the County Level in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas, 1990-
2016 
 
I.  Introduction 
The 2016 presidential election illustrated the growing divide between urban and rural 
America.  Rural counties across the country voted overwhelmingly for Republican Donald 
Trump, while central city and highly educated suburban counties shifted to the Democrats.  This 
paper evaluates the extent and causes of county-level partisan change in presidential and 
midterm elections in the states of Georgia, Ohio, and Texas from the 1990 midterm elections 
through the 2016 presidential election cycle.  The focus is on analyzing aggregate county-level 
voting behavior in each of the three states and in sub-state urban regions.  This paper assesses 
how demographic, electoral, cultural, and economic factors explain changes in Democratic Party 
vote percentages at the county level over time.   
The study of partisan change and realignment has been an important part of the literature 
on U.S. elections and electoral behavior since the seminal works of V. O. Key (1955; 1959) in 
the 1950s.  According to Bullock, Hoffman, and Gaddie (2006, p. 497),  
[R]ealignment is a dramatic change in the partisan expressions of 
constituencies and communities.  The change is long lasting.  It 
can occur suddenly, as with a critical realignment, or over time in a 
secular realignment.  Realignment is not necessarily a change in 
the actual partisan identification of individuals, but of the 
composition of partisan preferences and choices made by the 
electorate in constituencies or groups. 
Key (1955; 1959) formulated two key theories explaining partisan political change in the U.S.  
First, Key (1955, p. 11) developed the concept of a “critical” realignment, which is a substantial, 
sudden, and durable partisan voting behavior movement occurring in a single election.  Key 
(1959) further augmented his realignment theory by identifying a second form of realignment, 
which he termed “secular.”  Secular realignments reflect gradual changes in the voting behavior 
of voters across multiple elections (Key 1959).  According to Key (1959, p. 199), “[a] secular 
shift in party attachment may be regarded as a movement of the members of a population 
category from party to party that extends over several presidential elections and appears to be 
independent of the peculiar factors influencing the vote at individual elections.”  In addition, Key 
(1959, p. 203) explains why secular realignments occur.  In Key’s (1959, p. 203) study, he found 
that “[t]he infusion of new elements in the population” led to secular changes in party support.  
Key (1959) noted that the in-migration of newcomers into an area did not immediately result in 
election changes.  Rather, electoral change gradually occurred over time due to the demographic 
changes (Key, 1959, p. 203).     
Why do the core voting blocks of political parties change over time?  The two main 
explanations for the occurrence of realignments are the conversion and mobilization hypotheses.  
According to the conversion thesis, realignments occur because existing voters change their 
partisan affiliation and voting tendencies to begin supporting another political party (Burnham 
1970; Ladd and Hadley 1978; Sundquist 1983).  The second explanation for realignment, the 
mobilization thesis, argues that changes in the strength of political parties is due to new voters in 
an area.  The group of new voters may include the young, new residents, and previously 
unengaged and disillusioned citizens.  The addition of these new voters can change the election 
dynamics to favor one party over another even if conversion of existing voters is minimal (Key 
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1955; Campbell et al. 1960; Petrocik 1981; Beck 1982; Campbell 1985; Carmines and Stimson 
1989).      
There is an important sub-focus in the realignment literature on regional and local 
realignments, often with an emphasis on the South (e.g., Bullock, Hoffman, and Gaddie 2006; 
Bullock 2010a; Bullock 2010b; Darmofal and Nardulli 2010; Nardulli 1995).  Bullock (2010a) 
notes that a regional secular realignment is occurring in the South, a process beginning in the 
period following World War II.  According to Bullock (2010a), partisan politics in the South 
revolve largely around race with Democrats winning most African American voters and 
Republicans garnering a large majority of white voters.  For example, in Georgia, Bullock 
(2010b, p. 62) notes that in the past Democrats maintained control in the state by maintaining at 
least 40 percent support from whites and overwhelming support from African Americans.  As the 
white vote percentage dropped, Republicans began to win at the statewide level in Georgia in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
In addition, a number of studies (e.g., Black and Black 2002;  Knuckey, 2006) have 
found a shift since the 1960s among southern whites away from the Democratic Party to the 
Republican Party, resulting in a secular realignment in many areas of the South.  The civil rights 
legislation of the 1960s, President Richard Nixon’s “Southern Strategy,” increases in socio-
economic status for southern whites, changes in cultural values and ideology, and a substantial 
in-migration of new residents into the region from other parts of the country are important 
factors explaining the ascendency of Republicans in the South (Campbell, 1977, pp. 37-38; 
McKee and Hayes, 2009, p. 402;  Knuckey, 2006, pp. 58-61).  Overall, the voting behavior 
literature documents realignments occurring more on a regional than national basis.  The South, 
in particular, has been undergoing realignment toward the Republican Party since the 1960s.  
Moving forward, this study assesses changes in the Democratic Party vote percentages in 
presidential and midterm elections at the county level dating back to 1990 in three states, 
Georgia, Ohio, and Texas.  Why is more research needed for voting trends at the county level?  
States are often large and diverse jurisdictions with many different areas within a state voting 
differently.  For instance, suburbs and central city counties often diverge in voting trends.  A 
solid Republican state could have significant concentrations of Democratic support, which is 
important for understanding sub-state political races, such as for U.S. House, for state legislature, 
and for county offices.  The concentrations of minority party support in a state may be evolving 
so that in the future the changes occurring at a local county level could result in a realignment at 
the state level.  For instance, counties in and around a large metropolitan area may be growing 
and diversifying much faster than counties in the rest of the state (e.g., Metropolitan Atlanta 
counties in Georgia).  The dramatic county-level changes may eventually result in a change in 
statewide partisan control. 
This paper analyzes sub-state regions (i.e., U.S. Census Metropolitan Statistical Areas of 
one million people of more) to more thoroughly assess causes of county level partisan change.  
Beck (1982) and Darmofal and Nardulli (2010) note the importance of studying realignment at a 
local or regional level, and this study seeks to contribute to the voting behavior literature by 
furthering this line of research by focusing on county-level partisan change.  Moreover, this 
study seeks to illustrate the growing political “red-blue” divide in America.  Recent survey data 
(e.g., Pew Research Center 2015) and research (e.g., McKee and Teigen 2009) indicate that 
Americans are increasingly polarized along “red” Republican and “blue” Democratic lines 
particularly with regard to living in rural/urban areas, age, and region of the U.S.  The growing 
urban/suburban and rural divide was evident in the 2016 presidential election with Republican 
3
Shock: The Evolution of Partisan Voting at the County Level
Published by Carroll Collected,
 4 
 
Donald Trump winning overwhelmingly in rural and blue collar counties and Democratic 
nominee Hillary Clinton making in-roads into traditionally Republican suburban areas in large 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).  
 In order to assess the dynamics of county partisan change in three U.S. states, this paper 
addresses the following research questions: 
(1)  What variables explain changes in the Democratic Party average vote percentages at 
the county level in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas, during the period 1990-2016? 
(2)  How do aggregate-level Democratic Party vote percentages at the sub-state level vary 
between MSA and non-MSA counties? 
Pursuing answers to these questions is critical for explaining the importance of local partisan 
change.  County level variations in partisan support levels may be masked by the focus on 
statewide election results, particularly in presidential races.  The Democratic Party vote 
percentage change is used in this study as the dependent variable to gauge two-party vote change 
over time at the county jurisdictional level.  The Republican Party vote percentages could also be 
used to conduct the same type of analyses.  The Democratic vote was chosen since previous 
works in this area have often focused on how various groups have left the Democratic Party 
since the 1930s.  For decades from the 1930s through the 1980s, the Democratic Party was the 
dominant political party at the state and local levels in the U.S.  In the 1990s, the Republican 
Party began to make large inroads into local jurisdictions, particularly in the South and in rural 
areas.  
 
II.  Explaining Aggregate-level Voting Behavior 
This paper uses sets of factors cited in the voting behavior literature to evaluate partisan 
change.  First, the demographic characteristics of a county are typically influential in 
determining aggregate-level partisan voting trends in an area.  The Michigan model of voting 
(Campbell et al. 1960) lays out a social-psychological framework for explaining partisan voting 
based on long-term factors such as party identification and demographic characteristics, 
including race, gender, and social class.  The Michigan model holds that these long-term political 
and social-psychological characteristics of voters result in consistent and predictable voting 
patterns when it comes to voting for one of the two major political parties.  Previous research 
studies (e.g., Knuckey 2006; McKee and Hayes 2009, Darmofal and Nardulli 2010) suggest that 
county-level demographics, particularly increases in the non-white population, are closely linked 
to party identification.  Numerous studies find a strong positive relationship between increases in 
the African American and overall nonwhite vote in an area and increases in Democratic Party 
vote strength (Pew Research Center, 2015; Campbell, 2002; McKee and Teigen, 2009).  Overall, 
it is expected that increases in the non-white populations of counties result in increases in 
Democratic Party average vote percentages.   
 
H1:  It is hypothesized that increases in the percentage of the population who are African 
American result in increases in Democratic Party vote percentages. 
 
H2:  It is hypothesized that increases in the percentage of the population who are Hispanic result 
in increases in Democratic Party vote percentages. 
 
Additional demographic variables that may affect partisan voting tendencies for 
jurisdictions are the socio-economic status (SES) characteristics of an area.  SES measures, 
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which are indicators of social class, typically include income level, occupational prestige, and 
educational attainment.  Previous research studies indicate mixed results with regard to the 
impacts of SES factors on partisan voting behavior.  On the one hand, some research suggests 
that higher socio-economic status individuals often vote more for Republicans than for 
Democrats (e.g., Key 1955; Campbell 2002; Knuckey 2006; Hawley 2015).  On the other hand, 
some research studies indicate that increases in educational attainment are positively related to 
Democratic vote increases.  For instance, McKee and Teigen (2009, p. 493) in an analysis of the 
2004 presidential election in the South at the county level found that increases in the percentage 
of the population with a Bachelor’s degree resulted in decreases in Republican voting.  Overall, 
in total, the existing evidence slightly tilts toward the conclusion that higher socio-economic 
status is positively related to voting Republican. 
 
H3:  It is hypothesized that increases in educational attainment levels in counties are negatively 
related to increases in Democratic vote percentages. 
 
Moreover, age is a demographic factor potentially affecting voting tendencies in 
jurisdictions in the U.S.  Studies have found that older voters tend to align more with the 
Republican Party while younger voters lean toward Democrats in greater numbers (Campbell 
2002, p. 223; McKee and Hayes 2009, pp. 405-406).  McKee and Hayes (2009, pp. 405-406) in a 
study of how southern Democratic and Republican primary voters are changing found that 60 
percent of Republican primary voters were aged 45 or older in 2008 compared to 53 percent for 
the Democrats.  The electorate age difference in primary elections between the parties is an 
indicator that older voters are gravitating more toward the Republican Party than the Democratic 
Party.  In addition, Campbell (2002, p. 223) found a positive relationship between increases in 
age and Republican Party voter identification.  Therefore, as the population of a county becomes 
older, it is expected to become more Republican and less Democratic leaning.   
 
H4:  It is hypothesized that increases in median age in counties are negatively related to increases 
in Democratic vote percentages. 
 
 Moreover, cultural factors related to urbanization are expected to be influential for 
explaining aggregate-level partisan voting.  Polling and academic research indicate an 
increasingly stark divide between citizens in urban metropolitan areas and those in rural areas 
(Gimpel and Karnes, 2006, p. 467).  Studies indicate that increasing urbanization and population 
density are associated with increases in Democratic Party voting (e.g., Campbell 2002; McKee 
and Teigen 2009).  McKee and Teigen (2009, p. 486) note that urbanites …  
are more likely to self-identify as liberals because tolerance is a 
way of life as well as an effective coping mechanism when living 
is such a varied setting.  Routine exposure to a variety of people 
undoubtedly sets in motion a different socialization process than 
the one present in a rural setting.   
In addition, Hawley (2015, p. 64) notes that “[i]t has also been argued that differences in 
communities’ built environments can shape political attitudes” and that “crowded urban areas 
encourage people to hold more egalitarian and liberal political attitudes.”  Since urban areas tend 
to have a broader mix of diverse people than rural places, it is expected that the Democratic Party 
percentage of the vote will increase in higher population density jurisdictions, such as counties in 
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large U.S. Census MSAs, and decrease in lower density rural areas outside of these urban 
regions.     
   
H5:  It is hypothesized that increases in the number of people per square mile (population 
density) in counties are positively related to increases in Democratic Party vote percentages.  
 
H6:  It is hypothesized that Democratic Party vote percentages are higher in counties in large 
MSAs than in counties outside of large MSAs. 
  
 Finally, economic factors, such as the unemployment rate and changes in income levels, 
have been found to influence voting in elections (Blackley and Shepard, 1994; Abrams and 
Butkiewicz, 1995; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000).  There is a line of thought that holds that 
voters are rational self-interested actors seeking to maximize their own benefits relative to costs.  
The rational self-interest motives of voters leads them to support candidates most in-line with 
their current personal economic situations.  Blackley and Shepard (1994, p. 366) note that “self-
interested voters are more likely to prefer a new president if they are experiencing 
unemployment or income losses…”  It is expected that increases in income levels benefit 
Republicans more than Democrats as people associate Republicans more with proposals to cut 
taxes and increase income levels. 
 
H7:  It is hypothesized that increases in median household incomes in counties result in lower 
Democratic Party vote percentages. 
 
III.  Methods 
As noted earlier in this paper, the dependent variable is the average percentage change in 
the Democratic Party vote for presidential and gubernatorial candidates in midterm and 
presidential elections at the county level.  The variable is created by averaging vote percentages 
for the same type of election (presidential or midterm gubernatorial) over three election cycles.  
The average of election vote percentages, often referred to in the electoral realignment literature 
as the “normal vote” (Converse, 1966), provides a foundation for measuring aggregate-level 
partisan change in counties (Key 1955, 1959; Converse, 1966; Campbell 1977; Campbell 1985; 
Darmofal, 2008; Darmofal and Nardulli 2010).  Converse (1966) developed the “normal vote” 
concept as part of the Michigan School to measure the extent of partisan change over time in a 
jurisdiction.  A “multi-election averages” approach used by Darmofal and Nardulli (2010, pp. 
262-263) is utilized in this study to calculate the average “normal vote” percentages for the 
Democratic Party at the county level.  Campbell (1977, p. 60) originally noted the need to use 
several different preceding elections for estimating a core vote for a political party in order to 
reduce the impact of short-term factors in any single election.  The “multi-election averages” 
methodology averages together a number of previous election results for a political party to 
reduce the effects of short-term factors (such as a controversy or presence of an unpopular 
incumbent President) on any one particular election result.   
For the purposes of this paper, the average percentage change in Democratic Party voting 
is calculated separately for midterm and presidential election years.  The average of consecutive 
election vote percentages is completed to minimize the impact of a single election on the 
analyses.  Campbell (1985, p. 362), for instance, averaged the Democratic presidential votes in 
1928, 1932, and 1936, to gauge the extent of the Democratic realignment in the 1930s.  In this 
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paper, the change in presidential election percentages is calculated by subtracting the 2000 
presidential election average (the average of the 1992, 1996, and 2000 presidential elections) 
from the 2016 presidential election average (the average of the 2008, 2012, and 2016 elections).  
The percentages are based on the Democratic Party share of the major two-party (Democratic 
and Republican) vote.  Moreover, the change in gubernatorial (midterm) election percentages is 
calculated by subtracting the 1998 gubernatorial election average (the average of the 1990, 1994, 
and 1998 elections) from the 2014 average for gubernatorial midterm elections (average of the 
2006, 2010, and 2014 election).  The percentages are based on the Democratic Party share of the 
major two-party (Democratic and Republican) vote.1  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for 
the dependent variable. 
In addition, in this study, demographic, electoral, cultural, and economic factors are used 
to assess county-level partisan change in the states of Georgia, Ohio, and Texas during the period 
spanning from 1990 through 2016.  Demographic factors in this paper are variables measuring 
race, age, and educational attainment levels.  First, the African American change in percentage of 
the population, 2000-2015, is an independent variable calculated using the change in the 
percentage of the total population between 2000 to 2015 who are African American (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2017b).  Second, the Hispanic change in percentage of the population, 2000-2015, is 
calculated by the change in the total population percentage between 2000 to 2015 who are 
Hispanic (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017b).  A third independent variable, the median age change 
(years) from 2000-2015 is figured by the median age of the population change (in years) between 
2000-2015 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017b).  Moreover, the educational attainment change variable 
is calculated as the change in the percentage of the population 25 years of age and over with a 
Bachelor’s degree or higher between 2000 and 2015 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017b). 
 In addition, other types of variables measuring the differences between midterm and 
presidential election cycles, population density, urbanity, and income levels are calculated and 
used in the analyses in this paper.  An electoral factor, a dichotomous variable distinguishing 
presidential and midterm election cycles, is used to highlight differences in voting between MSA 
and non-MSA counties in each state in Table 5.  Moreover, this study uses cultural factors 
focused on “urbanity” to assess how increases in population density and county MSA status 
affect Democratic Party voting.  The population density change variable is calculated as the 
change in population per square mile of land (number of people) from 2000 to 2015 (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2017b).  The Urban/suburban (“urbanity”) variable is created based upon U.S. 
Census Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) populations with a “1” for counties in MSAs with 
more than one million people and a “0” for counties not in a MSA or one million or more 
people.2 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017a).  Finally, the economic indicator of median household 
income is used to examine if economic concerns play a role in voting.  The median household 
income variable is the percentage change in median household income in counties from 2000 to 
2015 (not adjusted for inflation) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017b).   
Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide results of OLS regression analyses testing the hypothesized 
relationships among the different variables.  In addition, difference of means tests (Table 5) and 
correlation analyses (Table 6) are conducted to test relationships among different variables.  In 
the data analyses in this paper, the OLS regression assumptions of linearity, normal distribution, 
and lack of multicollinearity were met.  The presence of some outlier counties in Texas creates a 
modest heteroskedasticity issue in the Texas models.  This situation reduces the precision of the 
coefficient estimates for Texas counties.  In Tables 5 and 6, difference of means and correlation 
analyses are presented to supplement the OLS regression findings. 
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 The states of Georgia, Ohio, and Texas are chosen for use in this paper because they 
provide representative examples of the different types of demographic changes occurring in the 
U.S. in contemporary politics.  The states of Georgia and Texas highlight suburban areas that are 
quickly growing and diversifying, and are gradually realigning toward the Democratic Party at a 
local level.  On the other hand, Ohio illustrates a different situation with low growth in most 
areas, declining populations in central cities and suburban areas typically Democratic in nature, 
and a graying of the electorate overall, which tends to benefit the GOP over time.  While other 
states could be used to illustrate these divergent types of changes occurring at the local county 
level within states, these three states are regarded as either current or emerging partisan 
battlegrounds for the 2020 elections.  So, the sub-state changes occurring in these three states 
may have a profound impact on future elections, particularly for U.S. President, while similar 
changes in states such as California and New York would likely not result in profound national 
political changes.  In addition, in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas, the growing divide between urban 
and rural areas is clearly illustrated, particularly during the Donald Trump Presidency.  The 
Republican Party vote percentage has jumped dramatically in rural counties in all three states, 
while Democratic strength, particularly in the fast growing and diverse metropolitan areas of 
Georgia and Texas, have been moving toward the Democrats.  In particular, suburban counties 
around cities such as Atlanta, Austin, Dallas, and Houston, once Republican strongholds, are 
now becoming battleground counties.  The changes occurring in these suburban counties were 
illustrated in the 2016 and 2018 elections.  While the changes were not enough to change the 
Republican dominance in these states in statewide elections, there was a clear tightening of 
statewide vote margins between Democrats and Republicans because of changes in suburban 
counties.   
Finally, in aggregate-level analyses, care needs to be taken to avoid the “ecological 
fallacy” problem of applying aggregate-level changes to individual-level voting behaviors.  The 
focus in this paper is on assessing county-level data, and not on trying to predict how individuals 
behave in elections.  Counties are used in this aggregate-level study of voting as the unit of 
analysis because, as McKee and Teigen (2009, p. 488) note, “… they are the smallest geographic 
unit for which reliable demographic and political data are available.”  U.S. Census data is widely 
available for counties, but not for precincts.  In addition, precinct and other local government 
borders change across time making comparisons across different election years problematic.   
 
 
IV.  Findings 
 The findings of the analyses of county-level data from Georgia, Ohio, and Texas are 
illustrated in Tables 2 through 6.  OLS regression results for President and Governor (midterm) 
for all counties in the three states are provided in Table 2.  Tables 3 and 4 lay out OLS regression 
results for counties by large U.S. Census MSA status.  Moreover, Table 5 provides an illustration 
of difference in means between MSA and non-MSA counties for President and Governor in the 
three states covered in this paper.  Finally, Table 6 provides bivariate correlation coefficients for 
the variables in this study. 
The first research question asked, what variables explain changes in the Democratic Party 
average vote percentages at the county level in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas, during the period 
1990-2016?  First, race is a moderately important factor determining Democratic Party vote 
outcomes in the various OLS regression, difference of means, and correlation analyses in Tables 
2 through 6.  As the proportion of the overall electorate who are African American increases in a 
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county, Democratic Party average vote percentages increase over time.  However, many of the 
coefficients are not statistically significant.  The most consistent impact of race on Democratic 
Party vote results is in Georgia with every one percentage point increase in the proportion of the 
population being African American resulting in about a half percentage point increase in the 
average Democratic Party vote (Table 2).  In addition, there is a similar effect in the MSA 
counties of Georgia, which compose the Atlanta metropolitan region (Table 3).  In Ohio, for 
President, there is a positive coefficient for both the African American and Hispanic variables.  
However, the other coefficients are not statistically significant.  The Texas results are not 
statistically significant except for a small positive correlation coefficient in Table 6 for President.  
Overall, increases in the African American population is a positive influence on Democratic 
voting, but the results are not consistently significant across elections.  The Hispanic impact is 
negligible, but is likely to become more important as Hispanics begin to participate in higher 
numbers in future elections in the fast growing and diversifying states of Georgia and Texas. 
Another important factor for aggregate-level voting outcomes is educational attainment, 
which is a measure of socio-economic status.  It was expected that increases in socio-economic 
status would be associated with lower Democratic Party vote percentages.  The OLS regression 
coefficients in this paper illustrate a mixed picture of the effect of SES on the Democratic vote.  
The majority of the coefficients are not statistically significant.  Of those that are significant, 
results from Georgia suggest a negative relationship between increases in educational attainment 
and Democratic Party vote percentages, while results from Ohio indicate a positive relationship.  
The Texas results are statistically insignificant.  The results indicate that in multivariate analyses, 
specific independent variables are more important in one state than another.   
Furthermore, as hypothesized, the variable measuring increases in the median age of 
voters in counties is negatively related to increases in Democratic Party vote percentages in 
presidential elections in Georgia and Ohio.  However, the majority of coefficients across the 
three states are statistically insignificant.  Based on the OLS regression results (Tables 2 and 3), 
increases in median age reduce Democratic Party vote percentages in presidential elections, 
indicating that an aging population in a county is a positive factor for Republicans.  The 
correlation coefficients are negative in Georgia and Ohio, and insignificant in Texas (Table 6).  
Overall, the findings suggest that an aging population in a county favors Republicans, while a 
younger electorate is more beneficial to Democrats.   
In the OLS regression models of Tables 2, 3, and 4, the most consistent and important 
variable for explaining changes in the Democratic Party average vote percentages in counties is 
increases in population density.  A related factor that is assessed in Table 5 are the differences in 
Democratic Party vote percentages in counties in large U.S. Census MSAs and counties in rural 
and smaller urban areas.  As hypothesized, increases in population density are positively 
associated with increases in the Democratic Party average vote percentages in presidential and 
gubernatorial elections in MSA and non-MSA counties in the three states.  While not all of the 
OLS regression coefficients are statistically significant, they are consistently in the positive 
direction and the beta coefficients indicate that population density is the most important factor 
for explaining changes in Democratic Party average votes.  The correlation coefficients in Table 
6 suggest a moderately strong, positive relationship between increasing population densities and 
increases in support for the Democratic Party.  These findings indicate that increasing 
urbanization and population density enhances Democratic Party vote percentages in urban and 
suburban counties in large MSAs.   
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Moreover, in Table 5, the difference of means results indicate that Democratic Party 
support is substantially higher in large MSA counties, on average, than in non-MSA counties.  
The county Democratic Party vote averages for MSA and non-MSA counties are statistically 
different for President across the three states, but only statistically significant for Governor in 
Texas.  For President, there is a substantially large decline in Democratic Party vote percentages 
for President in non-MSA counties, suggesting a growing urban/suburban and rural partisan 
divide in the three states for Democrats.  However, for gubernatorial elections held during 
midterm election cycles, there is very little difference in Democratic Party vote percentages 
between large MSA counties and counties outside of large MSA regions, except in Texas.  The 
presidential election results illustrate a meaningful difference between urban/suburban and rural 
counties, but the differences are less pronounced in midterm gubernatorial elections.  The 
differences between presidential and gubernatorial elections is likely due to higher turnout and a 
more diverse electorate participating in presidential than in midterm elections.  The presidential 
electorate advantages Democrats more than does the composition of the typical midterm 
electorate. 
Finally, changes in median household income is a moderately important factor for 
explaining Democratic Party support at the county level.  Overall, there is a consistent negative 
relationship (except for gubernatorial elections in Texas) between increases in median household 
income and Democratic Party average vote percentages.  Democratic Party support generally 
drops as the median household income increases.  This result suggests that there is a small self-
interest motivation for voters in elections, with Republicans generally benefitting from increases 
in income levels. 
 Moreover, the second research question in this study focused on the question of how do 
aggregate-level Democratic Party vote percentages at the sub-state level vary between MSA and 
non-MSA counties?  In Table 5, MSA and non-MSA average vote percentage changes for 
different offices for the Democratic Party vote are presented for presidential and midterm 
gubernatorial elections.  For presidential elections, there are substantial, statistically significant 
differences between counties in urban/suburban MSA regions of one million people or more and 
counties outside of these large MSAs.  For instance, in Georgia, the average change in the 
Democratic Party percentage average of the presidential vote between 2000 and 2016 was -5.99 
percent, compared to -12.56 for non-MSA counties.  Similar results are present for Ohio and 
Texas.  However, for midterm elections for Governor, the differences between MSA and non-
MSA counties in Georgia and Ohio are not statistically significant.  Only for Texas, is there a 
statistically significant difference showing less decline in MSA counties than in non-MSA areas.  
The difference of means results in Table 5 illustrate presidential and midterm elections are 
fundamentally differently.  The Democratic Party vote percentage is stronger in the higher 
turnout presidential elections than in the lower turnout midterm elections, but the results vary 
considerably across states, MSA/non-MSA counties, and type of election. 
 Overall, the results in Tables 2 through 6 for presidential and gubernatorial elections 
indicate that changing demographics are having significant impacts on election results.  Increases 
in the non-white populations of counties is a positive factor for increasing Democratic Party 
strength.  On the other hand, increases in median age and in median household income are 
negatively related to increases in Democratic Party vote averages.  In addition, and more 
importantly, increasing population density per square mile, a measure of urbanization, is a 
positive factor for Democratic Party vote percentages in both presidential and midterm election 
cycles.  Moreover, as illustrated in Table 5, there are substantial differences between large MSA 
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counties and non-MSA counties across the three states analyzed.  The differences between 
counties in large MSAs and those outside of these areas are less pronounced in lower turnout 
midterm gubernatorial elections.   
 
V.  Conclusions 
 V. O. Key in the 1950s identified critical and secular partisan realignment processes for 
explaining long-lasting and durable voting behavior changes (Key 1955, 1959).  In addition, 
Nardulli (1995) and others (e.g., Jackson and Carsey, 1999; Darmofal, 2008; Darmofal and 
Nardulli, 2010) found that partisan realignments are often local or regional phenomena.  In this 
paper, the local nature of partisan changes are evaluated with a focus on county-level aggregate 
voting behavior.  Since the 1990 elections, significant changes have occurred at the county level 
in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas.  The most significant finding is that increasing urbanization is 
fundamentally changing politics by enhancing the urban-rural divide in American politics.  The 
divide is more apparent in high turnout presidential elections than in lower participation midterm 
elections for state governor.  In particular, increases in population density over time and the 
presence of a county in a large U.S. Census MSA of one million people or more increases the 
average Democratic Party vote percentages for presidential and gubernatorial races.  This is most 
noticeable in Tables 3 and 4 where increases in population density in Georgia and Texas are 
associated with increased in the Democratic vote.  Since the populations of Georgia and Texas 
are growing faster than in Ohio, this is an expected occurrence.  In addition to urbanization 
processes, increases in the African American population in counties has an important positive 
effect on Democratic Party average vote percentages.  On the other hand, increases in median 
age and median household income at the county level results in decreases in the Democratic 
Party vote.  However, turnout rates for nonwhite voters matter, and power shifts at the statewide 
level may not occur in the near future due to most statewide offices being elected in midterm 
elections with lower turnouts and more favorable Republican electorates.    
In conclusion, this aggregate-level assessment of partisan voting in counties in Georgia, 
Ohio, and Texas illustrates the growing political “red-blue” divide in America.  Demographic 
and other aggregate changes are often analyzed at a statewide level, but the true magnitude of 
these changes are better viewed using county-level data.  The diverse and high population “core” 
counties of large MSA regions are moving toward Democrats, even though some of the counties 
at an aggregate-level still vote Republican overall.  The less populated and less diverse counties 
outside of major MSAs are moving in an opposite direction toward Republicans.  The results 
from this study illustrate the propensity of voters to sort themselves into similar like-minded 
communities, and in the states analyzed, the county-level voting data indicate that the “Red 
State” and “Blue State” divide is relevant in local counties as well as at the state level. 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variable, Change in Democratic Vote 
Percentages*  
State Election 
type 
N Mean  
(Std. Error) 
Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
Georgia       
 President 159 -11.36 
(0.82) 
-29.27 25.38 10.37 
 Governor 159 -17.27 
(0.75) 
-36.50 20.56 9.51 
Ohio       
 President 88 -6.04 
(0.66) 
-21.96 11.59 6.20 
 Governor 88 7.32 
(0.48) 
-4.94 20.75 4.51 
Texas       
 President 254 -14.06 
(0.63) 
-34.73 12.03 10.00 
 Governor 254 -7.94 
(0.44) 
-26.51 10.54 7.06 
*The data in this table reflect changes in the average vote percentages for Democratic Party 
candidates for President of the U.S. (2000 to 2016) and Governor (1998 to 2014).    
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TABLE 2:  Determinants of Change in Democratic Party Average Vote Percentages for 
U.S. President and Governor (All Counties in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas), 1990-2016a 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
 
President 
(Georgia) 
Governor 
(Georgia) 
President 
(Ohio) 
Governor 
(Ohio)  
President 
(Texas) 
Governor 
(Texas) 
African American change in 
percentage of population, 
2000-2015 
0.525** b 
(0.149) c 
0.273 d 
0.441** 
(0.146) 
0.251 
1.073* 
(0.539) 
0.170 
0.922 
(0.572) 
0.200 
0.345 
(0.354) 
0.056 
-0.215 
(0.262) 
-0.050 
Hispanic change in 
percentage of population, 
2000-2015 
-0.140 
(0.278) 
-0.036 
-0.259 
(0.272) 
-0.073 
3.020** 
(0.818) 
0.333 
1.444 
(0.868) 
0.218 
0.014 
(0.145) 
0.006 
-0.037 
(0.107) 
-0.021 
Educational attainment 
(Bachelor’s degree or 
higher) percentage change 
in population, 2000-2015 
-0.283 
(0.264) 
-0.076 
-1.077** 
(0.258) 
-0.314 
1.019** 
(0.247) 
0.320 
0.364 
(0.262) 
0.157 
-0.092 
(0.195) 
-0.028 
-0.056 
(0.144) 
-0.024 
Median age change (years), 
2000-2015 
-0.659* 
(0.328) 
-0.141 
-0.285 
(0.321) 
-0.067 
-0.472 
(0.317) 
-0.117 
0.497 
(0.336) 
0.169 
-0.346 
(0.220) 
-0.094 
0.126 
(0.163) 
0.048 
Population density change 
(number of people) per 
square mile, 2000-2015 
0.043** 
(0.010) 
0.349 
0.027** 
(0.010) 
0.242 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.067 
-0.016 
(0.009) 
-0.192 
0.058** 
(0.007) 
0.467 
0.038** 
(0.005) 
0.431 
Median household income 
percentage change, 1999-
2015  
-0.119* 
(0.059) 
-0.142 
-0.120* 
(0.058) 
-0.156 
-0.195** 
(0.058) 
-0.274 
-0.010 
(0.061) 
-0.020 
0.017 
(0.032) 
0.031 
0.056* 
(0.024) 
0.146 
       
ADJ. R2 0.370 0.281 0.572 0.093 0.224 0.149 
N 159 159 88 88 253 253 
F-STATISTIC 16.436** 11.283** 20.393** 2.492 13.096** 8.338** 
CONSTANT -7.643** 
(2.068) 
-11.384** 
(2.024) 
-7.903** 
(2.538) 
1.921 
(2.692) 
-15.309** 
(2.028) 
-11.187** 
(1.497) 
Significance (two-tailed):  *p < 0.05   **p < 0.01 
a Dependent variable:  Percentage change in the three-election average vote for the Democratic 
Party presidential or gubernatorial candidate spanning elections from 1990 through 2016.  See 
Table 1 for the operationalization of the variable.  
b Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients 
c Standard errors 
d Standardized beta coefficients 
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TABLE 3:  Determinants of Change in Democratic Party Average Vote Percentages for 
U.S. President (MSA and Non-MSA Counties in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas), 1990-2016a 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
 
MSA 
Counties - 
President 
(Georgia) 
Non-MSA 
Counties - 
President 
(Georgia) 
MSA 
Counties - 
President 
(Ohio) 
Non-MSA 
Counties - 
President 
(Ohio) 
MSA 
Counties - 
President 
(Texas) 
Non-MSA 
Counties - 
President 
(Texas) 
African American change in 
percentage of population, 
2000-2015 
0.662** b 
(0.225) c 
0.410 d 
-0.104 
(0.263) 
-0.039 
0.913 
(0.811) 
0.263 
0.980 
(0.949) 
0.104 
1.081 
(0.957) 
0.186 
0.148 
(0.373) 
0.025 
Hispanic change in 
percentage of population, 
2000-2015 
-1.394 
(1.140) 
-0.188 
-0.492 
(0.305) 
-0.162 
-0.133 
(1.985) 
-0.017 
3.537** 
(0.872) 
0.410 
-0.467 
(0.803) 
-0.103 
0.035 
(0.146) 
0.016 
Educational attainment 
(Bachelor’s degree or 
higher) percentage change 
in population, 2000-2015 
0.180 
(0.633) 
0.037 
-0.214 
(0.297) 
-0.064 
0.925* 
(0.435) 
0.349 
0.290 
(0.348) 
0.074 
0.134 
(0.754) 
0.030 
-0.219 
(0.204) 
-0.070 
Median age change (years), 
2000-2015 
0.317 
(1.484) 
0.029 
-0.801* 
(0.351) 
-0.222 
-2.728* 
(1.218) 
-0.590 
-0.383 
(0.332) 
-0.111 
-0.005 
(0.854) 
-0.001 
-0.329 
(0.224) 
-0.099 
Population density change 
(number of people) per 
square mile, 2000-2015 
0.050** 
(0.015) 
0.494 
0.080** 
(0.027) 
0.275 
-0.000 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
0.059 
(0.036) 
0.151 
0.037** 
(0.009) 
0.623 
0.192** 
(0.031) 
0.395 
Median household income 
percentage change, 1999-
2015  
-0.700* 
(0.275) 
-0.444 
-0.104 
(0.060) 
-0.156 
-0.183 
(0.254) 
-0.188 
-0.235** 
(0.058) 
-0.396 
-0.077 
(0.152) 
-0.089 
0.034 
(0.033) 
0.069 
       
ADJ. R2 0.749 0.120 0.657 0.520 0.519 0.158 
N 29 130 20 68 35 218 
F-STATISTIC 14.920** 3.937** 7.069** 13.120** 7.122** 7.812** 
CONSTANT -5.066 
(6.270) 
-6.722** 
(2.229) 
6.725 
(11.984) 
-5.621 
(2.869) 
-7.352 
(10.881) 
-16.901** 
(2.053) 
Significance (two-tailed):  *p < 0.05   **p < 0.01 
a Dependent variable:  Percentage change in the three-election average vote for the Democratic 
Party presidential or gubernatorial candidate spanning elections from 1990 through 2016.  See 
Table 1 for the operationalization of the variable.  
b Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients 
c Standard errors 
d Standardized beta coefficients 
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TABLE 4:  Determinants of Change in Democratic Party Average Vote Percentages for 
Governor (MSA and Non-MSA Counties in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas), 1990-2016a 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
 
MSA 
Counties - 
Governor 
(Georgia) 
Non-MSA 
Counties - 
Governor 
(Georgia) 
MSA 
Counties - 
Governor 
(Ohio) 
Non-MSA 
Counties - 
Governor 
(Ohio) 
MSA 
Counties - 
Governor 
(Texas) 
Non-MSA 
Counties - 
Governor 
(Texas) 
African American change in 
percentage of population, 
2000-2015 
0.510 b 
(0.263) c 
0.338 d 
-0.038 
(0.245) 
-0.015 
-0.058 
(0.933) 
-0.022 
1.106 
(1.084) 
0.143 
0.398 
(0.673) 
0.113 
-0.315 
(0.284) 
-0.073 
Hispanic change in 
percentage of population, 
2000-2015 
-2.578 
(1.332) 
-0.371 
-0.428 
(0.285) 
-0.149 
2.718 
(2.283) 
0.465 
0.850 
(0.995) 
0.120 
-0.358 
(0.565) 
-0.130 
-0.035 
(0.111) 
-0.022 
Educational attainment 
(Bachelor’s degree or 
higher) percentage change 
in population, 2000-2015 
-0.186 
(0.739) 
-0.040 
-1.023** 
(0.278) 
-0.325 
0.175 
(0.500) 
0.087 
0.872* 
(0.397) 
0.270 
-0.557 
(0.530) 
-0.203 
-0.128 
(0.155) 
-0.056) 
Median age change (years), 
2000-2015 
-0.100 
(1.734) 
-0.010 
-0.447 
(0.327) 
-0.131 
-0.155 
(1.401) 
-0.044 
0.576 
(0.379) 
0.203 
0.176 
(0.601) 
0.051 
0.118 
(0.170) 
0.049 
Population density change 
(number of people) per 
square mile, 2000-2015 
0.048* 
(0.018) 
0.507 
0.015 
(0.025) 
0.054 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.162 
-0.048 
(0.041) 
-0.151 
0.023** 
(0.007) 
0.636 
0.101** 
(0.023) 
0.286 
Median household income 
percentage change, 1999-
2015  
-0.764* 
(0.321) 
-0.517 
-0.090 
(0.056) 
-0.143 
-0.254 
(0.292) 
-0.342 
0.007 
(0.067) 
0.015 
0.077 
(0.107) 
0.145 
0.067** 
(0.025) 
0.184 
       
ADJ. R2 0.608 0.142 0.220 0.068 0.352 0.077 
N 29 130 20 68 35 218 
F-STATISTIC 8.240** 4.5567** 1.895 1.817 4.074** 4.037** 
CONSTANT -5.492 
(7.326) 
-10.416** 
(2.081) 
10.038 
(13.781) 
0.071 
(3.274) 
-4.644 
(7.658) 
-12.058** 
(1.562) 
Significance (two-tailed):  *p < 0.05   **p < 0.01 
a Dependent variable:  Percentage change in the three-election average vote for the Democratic 
Party presidential or gubernatorial candidate spanning elections from 1990 through 2016.  See 
Table 1 for the operationalization of the variable.  
b Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients 
c Standard errors 
d Standardized beta coefficients 
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TABLE 5:  Comparing Mean Averages in MSA and Non-MSA Counties a 
Change in Democratic Party Average 
Vote for President:  2000 to 2016 MSA b 
Non-
MSA Sig.  
 
Georgia (N=159; MSA counties = 29, 
Non-MSA counties = 130) -5.99 -12.56 **  
 
Ohio (N=88; MSA counties = 20, Non-
MSA counties = 68) -1.19 -7.47 **  
 
Texas (N=254; MSA counties = 35, Non-
MSA counties = 219) -6.31 -15.29 **  
 
          
Change in Democratic Party Average 
Vote for Governor (Mid-term 
elections):  1998 to 2014 MSA 
Non-
MSA Sig.  
 
Georgia (N=159; MSA counties = 29, 
Non-MSA counties = 130) -15.44 -17.68 NS  
 
Ohio (N=88; MSA counties = 20, Non-
MSA counties = 68) 7.45 7.28 NS  
 
Texas (N=254; MSA counties = 35, Non-
MSA counties = 219) -2.78 -8.77 **  
 
Significance:  *p < 0.05   **p < 0.01   NS = Not significant 
a Average county vote percentage for MSA and non-MSA 
counties  
 
b MSA counties in Georgia are the 29 counties composing the Atlanta-
Sandy Springs-Roswell MSA.  No other MSA in Georgia exceeds one 
million people. 
 
Springs-Roswell MSA.  No other MSA in Georgia exceeds one million 
people. 
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TABLE 6:  Bi-variate Correlations (Pearson’s r)  
GA: Dem. 
Pres. Vote 
Average 
Percentage
Change, 
2000-2016 
OH: Dem. 
Pres. Vote 
Average 
Percentage
Change, 
2000-2016 
TX: Dem. 
Pres. Vote 
Average 
Percentage
Change, 
2000-2016 
 GA:  Dem. 
Gov. Vote 
Average 
Percent 
Change, 
1998-2014 
OH:  Dem. 
Gov. Vote 
Average 
Percent 
Change, 
1998-2014 
TX:  Dem. 
Gov. Vote 
Average 
Percent 
Change, 
1998-2014 
African American 
change in 
percentage of 
population, 2000-
2015 
0.505** 0.492** 0.184**  0.379** 0.236* 0.057 
Hispanic change in 
percentage of 
population, 2000-
2015 
0.141 0.640** 0.047  0.044 0.288** -0.023 
Educational 
attainment 
(Bachelor’s degree 
or higher) 
percentage change 
in population, 2000-
2015 
0.015 0.433** 0.032  -0.255** 0.129 0.056 
Median age change 
(years), 2000-2015 
-0.304** -0.370** -0.123  -0.218** 0.009 0.003 
Population density 
change (number of 
people) per square 
mile, 2000-2015 
0.506** 0.194 0.475**  0.294** -.106 0.384** 
Median household 
income percentage 
change, 1999-2015  
-0.295** -0.402** -0.41  -0.324** -0.166 0.047 
N= 159 88 254  159 88 254 
Significance:  *p <0.05 
**p < 0.01 
       
Significance:  *p <0.05   **p < 0.01 
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1 The sources for the data for calculating the dependent variable are the Florida Department of 
State (2017), the Georgia Secretary of State (2017), and the North Carolina State Board of 
Elections (2017). 
 
2  Urban Counties -- U.S. Census Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) of 1,000,000 or more 
people (as of 2015):   
 
GEORGIA 
1.  Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA MSA (5,614,323) 
 
OHIO 
1.  Cleveland-Elyria, OH MSA (2,077,240) 
2.  Columbus, OH MSA (1,836,536) 
3.  Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN MSA (Ohio counties only) (1,624,983) 
 
TEXAS 
1.  Dallas-Fort-Worth-Arlington, TX MSA (6,003,967) 
2.  Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX MSA (5,539,949) 
3.  San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX MSA (1,942,217) 
4.  Austin-Round Rock, TX MSA (1,513,565) 
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